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Immigration-Related State and Local
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the
Proper Role for Enforcement
Michael A. Olivast

In a forum a dozen years ago on preemption issues and the
proper balance between national immigration obligations and the
role to be accorded states in immigration enforcement, I disagreed with those persons, such as Professor Peter J. Spiro, who
saw the failure of federal enforcement as an opening for more
robust state assumption of the needed actions. We did not consider local, county, or other sub-state jurisdictions, but I believe
that the same principles would apply in our formulations.
Abridged, here was what I wrote:
Peter Spiro's thoughtful Article offers the tempting thesis:
what if immigration policy were regulated by the individual states rather than being preempted by federal powers? What would U.S. immigration policies be if they
could be determined at the state level, in 50 "laboratories," instead of the stale, preclusionary logic mindlessly
applied to the implementation of federal immigration and
nationality law? Could such a scheme work, and would it
lead to better results? Has the doctrine of federal preemption run its course, leading to hidebound practices, statelevel frustration, and a moribund jurisprudence? Professor Spiro certainly believes that the traditional reasons
advanced for preemption in the immigration and nationality context have not kept pace with developments in the
modern federalism that is the United States.
t William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law, University of Houston Law Center
and Director of the Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, University of
Houston. I thank Deborah Y. Jones, Chenglin Liu, and Deterrean Gamble, of the University of Houston Law Center, for their assistance in the preparation of this article. I also
acknowledge the assistance of the many University of Chicago Legal Forum students
involved in the project leading to this publication.
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He contrasts the "extreme skepticism" with which state
immigration measures are received by courts with the
"federal discretion [that is] so unfettered by judicial constraint." He then critiques a three part equation: that
immigration is an aspect of foreign policy and is therefore
intrinsically federal; admissions decisions are in the federal domain and cannot be undermined by state level
plans to discriminate against aliens; and the equal protection doctrine extends to resident and undocumented
aliens. This trilogy of reasons underpinning the preemption doctrine is a weak foundation for Spiro, and he gives
short shrift to the second and third justifications. Because
of the. abject failure of the government to control the flow
of undocumented (and to a lesser, and different extent,
resident) aliens, "[t]he near-complete disabling of the
states on immigration matters ... can ultimately hang
only by the foreign relations thread. If this premise unravels, the existing imbalance in the institutional allocation of power must also fall."
This is a tantalizing premise, one that has surface appeal
both to the political left and right: while progressive immigration advocates could see the possibility of safe havens, local exceptions to a harsh federal scheme, and decentralized opportunities for relaxed enforcement, conservatives or immigration restrictionists can be attracted by
the tightening up of alien benefits, more vigorous state
border enforcement, and by the possibility of improved local control of political communities. Moreover, there is a
surface plausibility, an intuitive sense that Professor
Spiro is onto an ineffable and subtle truth. It is almost
foolish to dispute the rise of unauthorized immigration, to
ignore the deep recession in California [in 1993-94], to be
unconcerned with the growth of the welfare state, or to
ignore a relationship among these observations: there are
data to show that people of color-those most likely to be
in direct contact and competition with undocumented
worker populations-are increasingly restrictionist in
their attitudes towards immigration. There is even some
preliminary evidence that Latinos are increasingly concerned with undocumented immigration.
Given this backdrop, including, most notably, California's
overwhelming passage of Proposition 187, an avowedly
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anti-alien ballot measure, the preemption doctrine seems,
to Professor Spiro, to be ineffectual and antiquated: If in
fact immigration no longer involves foreign relations or
foreign relations no longer remains an exclusive federal
responsibility, then the states are not properly excluded
from acting in certain ways that affect immigration and
the treatment of aliens. The problem with this particular
reasoning, indeed, this entire line of reasoning, is that
there is no compelling reason to discard the preemption
power, as it retains its common law and statutory vitality;
the premises behind the state preclusion/state rights
equation are not as one-sided as Spiro (or restrictionists,
generally) would have us believe; and the momentum of
"demi-sovereignties" runs in the opposite direction, that
is, it is not the individual 50 states that are shedding
their traditional place in federalism's constitutional arrangement, rather it is the nation-state repositioning itself in regional, transnational, multilateral compacts and
arrangements between and among nations that is evident
in the world polity. If anything, preemption may be on the
rise in the immigration context, as it is in other complex
arenas, due to the internationalization of the United
States and world economies. Professor Spiro may be misreading the clear signposts of a postmodern economy, one
in which federalism further subsumes its members' subfederal ties deeper into a national or regional domicile.
Those who wish to see preemption's raw political capability or enforcement power decline may be overlooking the
clear and unmistakable signs of its resurgence and longevity. Reports of its demise are premature. 1
I do not want to re-argue these points here, but I do wish to
unpack the first premise of Spiro's argument, what I dubbed the
"Hydraulic Doctrine of Preemption," as it is this feature that I
believe most accurately describes the current landscape.
My argument follows the first of the three strands of Professor Spiro's argumentation. First, I review his treatment of the
doctrine of preemption: he sees preemption as an essentially unprincipled abrogation of states' rights, one that has led to a moriI Michael A. Olivas, Comment, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State
Rights, and Alienage Classifications,35 Va J Intl L 217, 217-19 (1994) (citations omitted)
(critiquing Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties,
35 Va J Intl L 121 (1994)).
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bund, formulaic refusal to deal meaningfully with immigration
realities. The various states are forced to act not because of any
preference for state action, but out of sheer necessity, due to a
failure of the federal government to patrol U.S. borders. In contrast,
[I see preemption as an hydraulic principle, one that
symmetrically flows between states and the federal government: there is a constant tug between the two levels,
in an almost-hydraulic relationship. As the federal piston
pulls, state powers are accordingly diminished; as the
state powers increase, the federal piston correspondingly
decreases. This equipoise relationship more accurately reflects current preemption doctrine than does Professor
2
Spiro's more all-or-nothing approach.
Inherent in Spiro's approach is a clear calculus: "If in fact
immigration no longer involves foreign relations or foreign relations no longer remains an exclusive federal responsibility, then
the states are not properly excluded from acting in certain ways
that affect immigration and the treatment of aliens."3 I questioned Spiro's reading of Gerald Neuman's characterization of
nascent nineteenth century U.S. immigration policy, 4 and employed several examples where the preemption doctrine was
alive and well, or even "firmly-rooted and on the rise."5 Here, I
also skip over the other two legs of his tripod, the assertions
about system failure ("impacts and responses") 6 and interna,
tional law norms (foreign relations power and what he "labels a
'sort of medieval construct in which multifarious sources of authority find their place on a vertical chain of hierarchy, one that
tolerates gross inequalities, but at the same time acknowledges
all powers"). 7 I concluded then, and still believe, that
"[p]reemption, for all its detriments and foolish inconsistencies,
is the devil we know. A postmodern state cannot coexist with
8
medieval constructs."

2 Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 219-20 (cited in note 1).

3 Id at 219.
4 See id at 221.

5 Id at 225 (using the history of federal preemption of state immigration enforcement
as an example).
6 Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 227 (cited in note 1).
7 Id at 235-36, citing Spiro, 35 Va J Intl L at 178 (cited in note 1).
8 Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 236 (cited in note 1).
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And then 1996 occurred, dialing back gains from the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") 9 by the enactment of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA") 1° and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA")." I
had not known, as I wrote that piece in 1994, that that time was
the high water mark of immigrant rights legislation, and that
virtually every bit of slack in the system would be removed and
all the holes plugged. It did not seem like a golden age at the
time for me, for my clients, and for the undocumented community, but it surely was. In fact, if I were pressed, I would identify
1982's Plyler v Doe12 as the real high water mark.
All this said, things today are decidedly worse, at least on
my side of the bar. In fairness, my many students who work and
litigate for Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"), and various immigration-related agencies are in clover. It is true that there are occasional spectacular victories for immigrant rights groups, sometimes even in the unexpected quarter of the Seventh Circuit,
where judges seem to revel in beating up on hapless BIA members or government lawyers-reminding me of the Seinfeld joke,
"not that there's anything wrong with that.' 13
With a torrent of state legislation related to immigration, it
is clear that the polity is more concerned with localized conditions than with foreign relations or demi-sovereignty. One indicator of this trend can be seen in the work of the National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"). The NCSL tracks immigration legislation, and noted that from January through June,
2006, almost 500 immigration-related bills had been introduced
14
in state legislatures, and 44 had been enacted, in 19 states.
9 Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359
(Nov 6, 1986).
10 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA"), Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996), codified in scattered sections of 8,
26, and 42 USC.
11 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ('IIRIRA"),
Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996), codified at 8 USC 1101 et seq.
12 457 US 202 (1982).
13 See, for example, Sepulveda v Gonzales, 464 F3d 770, 772 (7th Cir 2006)
("[A]dministrative agencies can change their minds. But they are required to give reasons
for doing so. In the cases we've cited-as in this case-the Board had failed to explain
how its rejection of the claimed social group squared with the test the Board had adopted
in Acosta.") (citations omitted).
14 See Ann Morse, Adam Blott, and Leya Speasmaker, 2006 State Legislation Related
to Immigration:Enacted, Vetoed, and Pending GubernatorialAction, National Conference
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Table 1
15
Enacted Bill Count (January1-October 31, 2006)
Main Topics:
Education
Employment
Identification/Driver's License
Law Enforcement
Legal Services
Omnibus
Public Benefits
Trafficking
Voting
Miscellaneous

3 bills
14 bills
6 bills
8 bills
5 bills
1 bill
10 bills
13 bills
6 bills
6 bills

3
9
5
6
5
1
7
9
6
5

states
states
states
states
states
state
states
states
states
states

These recent changes run the gamut, from enacting two proimmigrant state programs for college tuition (one of which, in
Nebraska, even extends to the undocumented) 16 to a number of
blatantly restrictionist statutes, including one in Georgia that
covers the entire waterfront: work authorization, human trafficking, enforcement provisions, regulation of immigration assistance
services, penalties and deductions for business expenses and tax
withholding, and overall benefit eligibility. 17 The Georgia state
statute even exceeds California's Proposition 187, virtually all of
which was struck down in court.18 These state statutes are mirof State Legislatures, available at <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/06ImmigEnacted
Legis.htm> (last visited Feb 25, 2007).
15 State Legislation Related to Immigration:Enacted, Vetoed, and Pending GubernatorialAction, October 31, 2006 (NCSL 2006) available at <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
immig/6ImmigEnactedLegis3.htm > (last visited June 20, 2007). These 72 bills were
enacted between January 1 and October 31, 2006 in 32 states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
16 The Nebraska Legislature revised the statute in 2006 over the governor's veto; the
statute now allows unauthorized immigrant students to qualify for instate tuition upon
proof of Nebraska residency of at least 180 days. See Neb Rev Stat § 85-502 (1943). The
Virginia Legislature established eligibility for in-state tuition for those holding an immigration visa or classified as a political refugee in the same manner as any other resident
student. Students with temporary or student visa status are ineligible for Virginia resident status and instate tuition. See Va Code Ann § 23-7.4(C) (Michie 2006).
17 See SB 529, to amend Titles 13, 16, 35, 42, 43, 48, and 50 of the Official Code of
Georgia
Annotated,
available
at <http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005-06/pdf/
sb529.pdf> (last visited Apr 16, 2007). Consider Rachel L. Swarns, In Georgia, Newest
Immigrants Unsettle an Old Sense of Place, NY Times Al (Aug 4, 2006) (describing how
recent influxes of Mexican immigrants have upset rural Georgian towns).
18 See LULAC v Wilson, 908 F Supp 755, 786-87 (C D Cal 1995) (striking down a
state referendum prohibiting social services and benefits to undocumented residents in a
scheme to deter immigration).
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rored by an increasing array of city, county, and regional laws
and regulations also reaching immigration regulation, while a
variety of long-existing or dormant codes are being dusted off,
redeployed, and applied to aliens. For example, a Maricopa
County (Phoenix, Arizona) prosecutor reinterpreted a state statute to deem undocumented presence as violative of smuggling
law, 19 while in New Hampshire, longstanding trespass ordinances were used to conduct alien sweeps. 20 The Hazleton, Pennsylvania City Council enacted a comprehensive "Illegal Immigration Relief Act" in July, 2006, with harsh provisions aimed at
alien renters, English-only documents, and provision of municipal services. A federal judge has enjoined the Hazleton ordinance
(and its successors), and the matter is pending as of Summer
2007.21 Other commercial, technical, and tax issues are also im22
plicated by such statutes.
19 Maricopa County undertook to prosecute undocumented persons for having conspired to smuggle themselves in violation of Arizona's anti-smuggling statute. See Ariz
Rev Stat. § 13-2319 (2006) ("human smuggling" statute) and Ariz Rev Stat § 13-1003
(general conspiracy statute). Consider Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, NY
Times Mag 40 (Oct 15, 2006) (presenting a general background on the issue of immigration in Arizona). For such use elsewhere, see Christopher Caldwell, A Family or A
Crowd?, NY Times Mag 9 (Feb 26, 2006) (describing the tightening of the definition of the
word "family" in the zoning code in Manassas, VA, in an attempt to reduce crowding
caused by immigrants). Consider David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in US Family Courts, 11 Tex Hisp
J L & Pol 45, 48 (2005) (documenting that immigrants receive unfavorable or discriminatory rulings in family courts).
20 See State of New Hampshire v Barros-Batistele, 05-CV-1474, 1475, slip op at 5
(Cheshire-Hillsborough Cty, Jaffrey-Peterborough Dist Ct, Nashua Dist Ct NH 2005)
('The import of the analysis the court has conducted [ I is that even if the police departments have applied the [state] statute in a manner not otherwise unlawful, its application in that manner violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
and is thus barred by federal preemption."). See also Pam Belluck, Towns Lose Tool
Against Illegal Immigrants, NY Times A7 (Aug 13, 2005) (discussing town police chiefs in
several New Hampshire towns who unsuccessfully filed trespassing charges against undocumented immigrants in an attempt to combat illegal immigration); Paul Vitello, Path
to Deportation Can Start With a Traffic Stop, NY Times Al (April 14, 2006) (discussing
county police department's attempts to enforce immigration law after arresting undocumented immigrants for violating minor state laws); Julia Preston, Sheriff Defies Transgressors By Billboardand by Blog, NY Times A15 (July 31, 2006) (discussing attempt by
county sheriff to apply state labor and tax laws to combat the underground economy that
uses undocumented immigrants). Sometimes, a local regulation is just a regulation, as in
liberal Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the aim was not to harass immigrants, but to keep
peddlers and nuisances off the historic Santa Fe Plaza; Erica Cordoza, Buskers Claim
They're Bullied. City to Revisit Soliciting Rules, Albuquerque J Al (Aug 8, 2006).
21 See Lozano v City of Hazleton, (Civ Action No 6-CV-56-JMM) *2-3 (M D Pa), first
amended complaint filed October 30, 2006, available at <http:www.aclu.org/immigrants/
discrim272201g120061030.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2007); Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
Agrees Not to Enforce "IllegalImmigration Relief Act Ordinance"For Now, 35 Interpreter
Releases 1947-48 (Sept 11, 2006) (describing the basic facts and status of the case). For
other examples of local action against illegal immigrants, see also Deborah Post, Two
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As Table 1 indicates, the subject matters addressed by states
have included education, employment, identification, driver's
licenses, law enforcement, legal services, omnibus immigration
matters, public benefits, housing and rental, trafficking, voting,
and miscellaneous issues such as alcohol and tobacco purchase
identification, gun and firearms permits, residency/domicile determinations, and juvenile reporting requirements. This extraordinary rise in such legislative interests is undoubtedly due to
overburdened locales, well publicized and highly polarized federal failures in immigration enforcement, a sharp rise in conservative media and advocates flogging the issue, and a decline in
President Bush's popularity, all of which have led to a leadership
vacuum in the field. In some ways, it has been a "perfect storm"
of anti-alien factors.
It is my thesis that state, county, and local ordinances aimed
at regulating general immigration functions are unconstitutional
as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers. If purely
state, county, or local interests are governed and if federal preemptory powers are not triggered, such ordinances could be
properly enacted, provided they are not subterfuges for replacing
or substituting for federal authority. As one example, purely
state benefits can be extended to or withheld from undocumented
college students, for tuition benefits and state residency determinations are properly designated as state classifications, which
reference but do not determine immigration status. 23 And the
Cases, Two Reactions, Same Lingering Problem: Farmingville and Bay Shore Evictions,
and Levy's Responses, Show Class Distinctionsare Still a Large Issue, Newsday A49 (Sept
25, 2005) (arguing that condemnation of housing by Suffolk County, NY officials was
motivated not by health and safety concerns but by inhabitants' status as undocumented
aliens); Jenny Jarvis, GeorgiaLaw Chills Its Latino Housing Market: A Measure Meant to
Deny Jobs and Services to Illegal Immigrants Has Even Legal Residents Rethinking Their
Future in the State, LA Times A4 (June 19, 2006) (noting that Georgia's recently passed
immigration law requires companies with state contracts to verify employees' immigration status, penalizes employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants, curtails
government benefits to ineligible immigrants, and requires jailers to check the immigration status of anyone charged with a felony).
22 See, for example, Paula Singer, IRS Tightens Controls on ITINs, Immigration L
Today 34 (Mar/Apr 2004). Consider Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering
Social Security With Billions, NY Times Al (Apr 5, 2005) (describing how many undocumented workers pay income tax); Eduardo Porter, Here Illegally, Working Hard and
Paying Taxes, NY Times Al (June 19, 2006) (describing the prevalence of undocumented
aliens in income tax paying employment); Cara Buckley, With Millions in 9/11 Payments,
Bereaved Can't Buy Green Cards, NY Times Al (Sept 3, 2006) (describing how some beneficiaries of the federal September 11 Victim Compensation Fund are undocumented immigrants).
23 See Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act, and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J Coll & Univ L 435, 452-53 (2004).
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federal government has enacted statutes and promulgated regulations that subcontract or designate state or sub-federal immigration enforcement; many examples include assorted Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") that calibrate and regulate a
proper role for effectuating federal obligations. But a number of
Supreme Court decisions mirror common law tradition in not
reserving or allowing a substantive role for local, county, state,
or multi-state authorities in immigration enforcement absent
24
such delegation and carefully controlled, designated purposes.
In my earlier reply to Professor Spiro, I laid out this argument at the higher end, that of preemption theory in accord with
his philosophy of demi-sovereigns and the foreign relations
power. 25 Here, I ground my assertion that such statutes implementing immigration functions must be struck down, in the
other end of the spectrum. I posit not that the federal government's failure to enforce its immigration laws requires that the
fifty states step in to do so (and by extension, counties and municipalities), but the opposite: that shifting immigration enforcement powers to sub-federal levels will more likely lead to
weaker federal enforcement and even less effective national security resources aimed at immigration enforcement and administration. In my view, not only is shifting immigration authority
downward contrary to constitutional law and theory, it is bad
policy and will lead to bad results both with immigration enforcement and local enforcement. Restrictionist proposals must of
necessity meet a very high burden of persuasion to enact major
changes to the established order of things. We do not want fifty
Border Patrols any more than we want fifty foreign policies in
the immigration context, and such a shift would leave the U.S.
24

Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 401 (1923) (striking down state English-only provi-

sions, because fluency in English "cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution"); Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 73-74 (1941) (finding preemption of Pennsylvania state law requiring alien registration fee); Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365,
376-80 (1971) (striking down state welfare restrictions on Equal Protection and preemption grounds); De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351, 354 (1976) (saying that regulation of immigration with modest and explicit exceptions, "is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power"); Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 81 (1976) (upholding medical benefit restrictions
enacted by the federal Congress, on theory that "decisions in [immigration] matters may
implicate our relations with foreign powers"); Toll v Moreno, 458 US 1, 45-46 (1982)
(finding that where states use federal immigration classifications to apportion a state
benefit and where the scheme makes distinctions clear, immigration classifications may
be used). See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, S Ct Rev 255, 306 (1984) (arguing that for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress's plenary power, allowing it singular authority to
make decisions concerning issues of immigration).
25 Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 219 (cited in note 1).
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worse off in every respect. For starters, there is no excess slack
in the system at present, and the high fiscal and political cost of
decentralizing immigration enforcement will be predictably ruinous and prejudicial.
In the remaining section of this analysis, I demonstrate this
hypothesis by three interlocking points. First, I examine one
well-established area in detail, noting how Plyler v Doe has
morphed beyond its K-12 public school tuition moorings. This
attestation to an important feature of immigrant life and the
U.S. polity demonstrates that even 25 years of immigrant children's rights have not been fully resolved and have required additional litigation and additional vigilance to secure the Supreme
Court's narrow ruling. Second, I review the assertions by a leading restrictionist scholar, Professor Kris Kobach, one who has
litigated benefits issues and who has advanced a theory of "inherent authority" to justify extending immigration apprehensions and enforcement to local levels by using a "quintessential
force multiplier" rationale. 26 Finally, I refer back to my hydraulic
metaphor to recalibrate general immigration provisions, post
9/11.
I. LIFE AFTER PLYLER VDOE
To restate my thesis, I believe there is no good or legitimate
reason to extend immigration enforcement to non-federal authorities any more than current law already allocates. In the
next Section, I take this on straight ahead by contesting Professor Kobach's world-view and prescriptions. However, I believe
this thesis can also be advanced by thick descriptions of a case
where more of an equilibrium has been reached, the case of undocumented school children, where the record reveals substantial
and longstanding accommodation to the 1982 development of
Plyler v Doe.27 Even this settled case has been contested regularly in school board meetings and classroom buildings, and as
26 Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority Of
Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 Albany L Rev 179, 181 (2005). But see
Hannah Gladstein, et al, Blurring the Lines: A Profile of State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law Using the National Crime Information Center Database, 20022004 29 (Migration Policy Institute 2005) (criticizing the DOJ's post-9/11 policy of engaging local police in the enforcement of routine civil immigration violations, and finding
that deputizing state and local police to be immigration agents without supervision or
training will result in wrongful detentions, diversion of attention from more important
public safety functions, and erosion of the trust of immigrant communities).
27 457 US 202 (1982).
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this record will show, the group that successfully litigated this
case has never been able to rest, litigating it as recently as
Spring, 2006.28 Thus, it has stretched more than thirty years,
since Texas enacted a state law in 1975 that enabled its public
school districts to charge tuition to undocumented school children.29 Although the underlying legislative history is unclear,
and although no public hearings were ever held on the provision,
certain superintendents of schools on the Texas border had encouraged the legislation, which was enacted without controversy
as a small piece of a larger, routine education statute. 30 In 1982,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
("MALDEF') attorneys prevailed in the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
31
5-4 opinion authored by Justice William Brennan.
Justice Brennan struck down the Texas statute, finding the
state's theory to be "nothing more than the assertion that illegal
entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a resident
for purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools." 32 He
determined that Texas could not enact legislation "merely by defining a disfavored group as nonresident." 33 He did not reach the
issue of preemption, as he was able to strike down the statute's
provisions on more narrow, Equal Protection grounds. 34 He dismissed the three arguments that Texas had advanced: that it
was preserving "limited resources," 35 that it had narrowly tai36
lored the legislation "to stem the tide of illegal immigration,"
and that they had singled out these children because their undocumented presence meant that they might not be allowed to
remain in the state once the educational benefit had been consumed. 37 In all, he held that the children had not violated immi28

Consider Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, the Education of Undocumented Chil-

dren, and the Polity, in David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck, eds, Immigration Stories
197 (Foundation 2005); Amy Miller, APS Safe for Migrant Students: Informal Policy is
Now Official, Albuquerque J Al (June 2, 2006) (reporting that school district agrees to
end policy of turning students over to immigration authorities).
29 Tex Code Ann § 21.031 (1981); Tex Educ Code Ann §21.031 (Vernon Supp 1981).
30 Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, the Education of Undocumented Children, and the Polity at
198-99 (cited in note 28). See also In re Alien Children, 501 F Supp 544, 555 n 19 (1980).
31 Plyler, 457 US 202. Consider Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 Colum L Rev 1, 54 (1984) (noting "epochal significance" of Plyler for the undocumented population).
32 Plyler, 457 US at 227 n 22.
33

Id.

34 See id at 230.

35 Id at 227.
36 Plyler, 457 US at 228 (citation omitted).
37 See id at 229-30.

38
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gration law and that the provision did "not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice." 38 In addition, in a footnote, he indicated that, "illegal entry into the country would not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile within a
39

State."

Texas appealed the case, but the Supreme Court denied rehearing. 40 Subsequent news stories about the alien children from
Tyler, Texas revealed that most of them had graduated from the
public schools and that they all had regularized their legal
status.4 1 In 1983, in Martinez v Bynum, 42 a corollary issue was
litigated involving a U.S. citizen child of undocumented Mexican
parents who had left the child in the care of his adult sister in a
Texas town. 43 This time, the Court determined that his domicile
was not in Texas. The case turned on a precept of traditional
family law, which holds that the domicile of unemancipated children is that of their parents. In this instance he was not a legal
charge of his sister, hence could not be considered a "resident" of
the Texas school district.44 Martinez v Bynum did not limit the
earlier holding in Plyler, and no other K-12 residency-related
immigration case has been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
since 1983. 45 Toll v Moreno,46 a postsecondary residency case involving non-immigrant visa holders, was decided in 1982 for the

38 Id at 220.

39 Id at 227 n 22 (citation omitted).
40 Plyler v Doe, 458 US 1131 (1982) (denying rehearing).
41 Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms Over Prop. 187's Legal Future, LA Times Al (Oct
23, 1994).
42 461 US 321 (1983).
43 See id at 322.

44 Id at 323. This is a legal infirmity that could be remedied by several means. For
instance, the sister could have become his legal guardian, a routine process, as long as
she was residing in the school district, or a family member could adopt the child. Immigration laws interact with family law and comparative law for determining such status.
See, for example, Kaho v Ilchert, 765 F2d 877, 885 (9th Cir 1985) (holding that adoptions
"need not conform to the BIA's or Anglo-American notions of adoption; [such an] adoption
need only be recognized under the law of the country where the adoption occurred"). For a
general discussion, see Thronson, 11 Tex Hisp J L & Poly at 47 (cited in note 19) (describing the "peculiar and conflicted mix" immigration law and family law form as they come
in constant and critical contact).
45 See Toll, 458 US at 9-10. Toll, decided by the same Supreme Court, was a higher
education case concerning residency requirements for long-time non-immigrants, and
whether they could be eligible for in-state tuition. The Court found that they were eligible. See also Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v Doe, Toll v Moreno, and PostsecondaryAdmissions: Undocumented Adults and "EnduringDisability", 15 J L & Educ 19, 55 (1986)
(analyzing the issue of undocumented alienage and postsecondary admissions).
46 458 US 1 (1982).
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alien college students on preemption grounds, and Plyler has re47
mained in force, undisturbed since 1982.

This is not to say that the case has not been contested or
challenged, at a variety of levels, in the twenty five years since it
was decided. As it happens, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, then in governmental and private practice, went on the
record at the time saying that they considered Plyler to have
been wrongly decided, and both their earlier views surfaced during their Supreme Court nomination hearings. 48 On the more
quotidian level, MALDEF lawyers have had to file several dozen
actions since the early 1980s to enforce Plyler's clear holding,
including combating school board actions requiring Social Security numbers, school requests for driver's licenses to identify parents, additional "registration" of immigrant children, "safety notification" for immigrant parents, separate schools for immigrant
children, college tuition policies, and other policies and practices
designed to identify immigration status or single out undocu49
mented children.
In 1994, his popularity sagging, California Republican Governor Pete Wilson backed a popular state referendum, Proposition 187, which would have denied virtually all state-funded
benefits (including public education) to undocumented Californians. 50 Prop. 187 passed by nearly 60 percent, and Wilson was
47 Consider Olivas, 15 J L & Educ at 29-33 (cited in note 45) (explaining the Toll
decision); Maria Pab6n L6pez, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented
Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 Seton Hall L Rev 1373, 1375 (2005) (arguing that
despite the Plyler decision, Latino undocumented students remain hostages of the political argument over immigration).
48 Chief Justice Roberts was particularly dismissive of the case, referring in his DOJ
memo to "illegal amigos," which he later explained to have been akin to ethnic politicking,
such as candidates speaking Spanish to Latino voters, etc. Confirmation Hearings on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States, Before the
Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, Sept 12-15, 2005 (US GPO, Serial No
J-109-37), 260 (remarks about "illegal amigos" in earlier memo), 390 (same, views about
Plyler as precedent), 596 (same), 1042 (MALDEF testimony). See also Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the United
States before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Jan 9-13, 2006 (US
GPO, Serial No J-109-56), 787 (immigration cases and 1986 memo), 1268 (MALDEF
testimony).
49 See Pab6n L6pez, 35 Seton Hall L Rev at 1395-98 (cited in note 47) (describing
both federal and state proposals contravening the mandate of Plyler and the groups that
organized to successfully defeat them); Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, The Education of Undocumented Children, and the Polity at 212-13 (cited in note 28).
50 See Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California'sProposition 187-Does It Mean What It
Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 10 Georgetown
Immig L J 577, 581 (1996) (listing the services Proposition 187 would have denied immigrants); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L Rev 1509, 1512-13 (1995) (recalling
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re-elected. Before Senator Robert Dole won his party's presidential nomination, Wilson also mounted a presidential campaign on
a get-tough-on-immigration platform. 5 1 MALDEF went into federal court and was able to strike down almost all of Prop. 187's
provisions, ultimately reaching an agreement with Wilson's successor, Governor Gray Davis. 52 The year 1996 saw the re-election
of President Clinton, 53 the enactment of restrictionist federal legislation JIRIRA and PWRORA, 5 4 and the efforts of U.S. Representative Elton Gallegly to amend federal law by allowing states
to enact the type of legislation that Texas had passed in 1975,
leading to Plyler.55 This "Gallegly Amendment" drew sufficient
negative attention to force its withdrawal from the other legislative proposals, a number of which were enacted. 56 Thus, the political process worked to rebuff challenges to undocumented Khow California's governor blamed aliens for draining billions of dollars from the state
treasury).
51 See Steven Greenhouse, About Face; Guess IWho's Embracing Immigrants Now, NY
Times D4 (March 5, 2000) (describing how immigrants were an important voting bloc in
the election); Pab6n L6pez, 35 Seton Hall L Rev at 1395-96 (cited at note 46). For background on the 2000 campaign, consider, Todd S. Pardum, Former California Governor
Rules Out Run for President, NY Times A19 (Feb 23, 1999).
52 Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, the Education of Undocumented Children, and the Polity at
212-13 (cited at note 27); Pab6n L6pez, 35 Seton Hall L Rev at 1396-98 (cited in note 47)
(describing LULACs challenge to Prop 187). See also Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187
Talks Offered Davis Few Choices, LA Times A3 (July 30, 1999) (discussing Governor
Davis and negotiations over Proposition 187).
53 For a general discussion see Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office: GettingReelected
Against All Odds (Random House 1997) (describing the author's role as a political consultant to Clinton during his 1996 reelection).
54 Consider Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdictionand the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 Harv L Rev 1963 (2000) (describing the federal courts' struggle with
the complex issues of statutory interpretation and constitutional law raised by the enactment of IIRIRA).
55 See Halle I. Butler, Note, Educated in the Classroom or on the Streets: The Fate of
Illegal Immigrant Children in the United States, 58 Ohio St L J 1473, 1485 (1997) ("[The
proposed Gallegly Amendment directly challenges Plyler at the federal level by allowing
states to prohibit illegal immigrant children from attending public schools."). Sometimes
these children surface when they are revealed by public achievements, as when they win
national awards that bring press coverage. Miriam Jordan, Princeton's 2006 Salutatorian
Heads to Oxford, Still an Illegal Immigrant, Wall St J B1 (Sept 14, 2006) (undocumented
college student from Dominican Republic). For two such examples of undocumented high
school students, both prompted by robotics competitions, see Peter Carlson, Stinky the
Robot, Four Kids And a Brief Whiff of Success, Wash Post C1 (Mar 29, 2005) (discussing
the story of four undocumented Mexican students); Mel Melendez, Ingenuity Brightens
Future: Doors Finally Open for 4 Phoenix Migrant Youths a Year After Beating MIT in
Robotics Competition, Ariz Rep 1A (Apr 23, 2005) (same); Nina Bernstein, Student's Prize
Is a Trip Into Immigration Limbo, NY Times Al (Apr 26, 2006) (describing fate of an
undocumented Senegalese student); Nina Bernstein, Senegalese Teenager in Deportation
Fight Wins Right to Study in America, NY Times B2 (July 29, 2006) (same).
56 See Butler, 58 Ohio St L J at 1485 (cited in note 55); Pab6n L6pez, 35 Seton Hall L
Rev at 1396 (cited in note 47).
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12 enrollment at the state and federal levels, even as tightened
immigration restrictions were enacted into law.
Although there have been regular end-runs and local school
board implementation issues since 1982, two new threats arose
in 2006 at the school level, both of which ultimately resolved
themselves. In March 2006, the school board in Elmwood Park,
Illinois refused to let an undocumented student enroll on the
grounds that she and her family had entered on tourist visas,
which had long ago expired. 57 Citing Plyler, the State Board of
Education threatened to remove funds, and the local board
blinked, revising its attendance policies.5 8 Even though persons
can become undocumented either by surreptitious entry or by
violating the terms of legal entry, earlier education decisions had
not turned on the means by which unauthorized status or entry
were effected but simply on undocumented status itself. In June
2006, a federal suit against the Albuquerque, New Mexico Public
Schools was settled, eliminating a practice of arresting students
on school property suspected of being out of status and turning
them in to the Border Patrol. 59
57 See Rosalind Rossi, State Strips Schools of $3.5 Million: District Following Law, It
Claims, by Refusing to Enroll Immigrant, Chi Sun-Times A8 (Feb 24, 2006) (identifying
the student as the dependent of a tourist); Eric Herman, Elmwood Park Schools Reinstated: District Agrees to Stop Barring Students Due to Immigration Status, Chi SunTimes A3 (Feb 25, 2006) (same). See also Sam Dillon, In Schools Across U.S., the Melting
Pot Overflows, NY Times Al (Aug 27, 2006) (describing that the explosive growth in
school enrollment included a diverse mix of people). For further discussion of the effects of
Plyler see, generally, Nina Bernstein, On Lucille Avenue, the Immigration Debate, NY
Times Al (June 26, 2006) (describing animosity toward immigrants based on perception
they are unfairly draining resources); Jennifer Radcliffe, 1982 Ruling a Catalyst in Immigration Debate: Court Opened Doors for Students but Put a Strain on School Districts,
Houston Chron B1 (May 21, 2006) (describing effect of Plyler v Doe on the public school
system in Houston).
58 See Colleen Mastony and Diane Rado, Elmwood Park Schools Give In: To Keep
State Funds, District Drops Fight On Immigrant Student, Chi Trib Cl (Feb 25, 2006)
(observing that school district asked judge to dismiss case); Colleen Mastony and Diane
Redo, Barred Teen Pleased as Lawsuit is Dropped: Elmwood Park District Reluctantly
Ends Fight, Chi Trib NS1 (Feb 28, 2006) (same). For another example of a non-immigrant
visa holder, one a bit less disadvantaged-an E-2, the dependent of a treaty investorwho was precluded from securing a student visa (an F-i), see Kelly Griffith, Immigration
Rules Bug Brits: Visa Delays Choke Businesses as "Pervasive"Problems Persist, Orlando
Sentinel J1 (Sept 10, 2006). Although the article does not say so, the likely culprit was
the requirement that such applicants for student visas not have an "intending immigrant" intent, that is, they must not appear to be wanting to remain in the U.S. after
their studies are completed, else the consular official will, with virtually-unreviewable
discretion, refuse admission to the country. See Daniel Walfish, Note, Student Visas and
the Illogic of the Intent Requirement, 17 Georgetown Immig L J 473 (2003) (describing in
more detail the process by Which student visas are granted, particularly the intent requirement).
59 Miller, APS Safe for Migrant Students at Al (cited in note 28); Amy Miller, Migrants Are Safe At APS: School Board Enacts Ban on Taking Part in Investigations of
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The issue of undocumented students has not been limited to
K-12 public school students, as a number of cases before and
since Plyler have dealt with the corollary issue of undocumented
college students, and the extent to which state resident tuition
and admissions benefits are to be extended to the postsecondary,
post-compulsory schooling level. Since 2001, when Texas Governor Rick Perry signed legislation into law granting postsecondary residency for undocumented students, a dozen states have
acted, ten allowing residency, and several denying it.60 Two federal cases were filed, challenging a Kansas statute allowing residency 6' and a Virginia statute denying such status. 6 2 But the
courts upheld the state practice in each instance, Kansas allowing residency and Virginia denying such status. The Kansas case
is pending in the Tenth Circuit, in a case brought by a restrictionist group and its lawyer, Professor Kobach. 63 The same case
Students' Legal Status, Albuquerque J C1 (June 15, 2006) (describing a new policy that
prohibits Albuquerque school employees from investigating students' immigration status,
offering any information about a student to immigration officials, or allowing immigration agents access to students on campus). While MALDEF settled with the school district, there were still additional defendants, including the City and the Albuquerque
Police Department, who had refused to settle as of late 2006. An earlier such case in El
Paso prevented the then-INS from conducting sweeps on school campuses. Murillo v
Musegades, 809 F Supp 487, 503 (W D Tex 1992) (enjoining immigration officers from
searching El Paso high school students on suspicion of immigration compliance and Mexican appearance). A more recent matter arose in the context of summer children's camp
funding. The program did not have a policy of tracking whether the children attending
were in the U.S. legally, causing a city council member to complain that undocumented
immigrant children were inappropriately receiving subsidies. Stephanie Sandoval, Funding Intact for Youth Camp, Dallas Morn News 1B (Sept 21, 2006).
60 See Olivas, 30 J Coll & Univ L at 455 n 122 (cited in note 23). The updated versions in Table 2 and Table 3 are taken from available state data, including those available from www.nilc.org, which tracks DREAM Act issues. See also Victor C. Romero,
PostsecondarySchool Educationfor Undocumented Immigrants:Promises and Pitfalls, 27
NC J Intl L & Comm Reg 393, 404-407 (2002) (describing state initiatives to grant undocumented immigrants postsecondary tuition benefits); Victor C. Romero, Noncitizen
Students and ImmigrationPolicy Post-9/11, 17 Georgetown Immigr L J 357, 357 (2003)
(describing the atmosphere for noncitizen students post-9/11 in the face of federal legislation such as the PATRIOT Act, the Border Commuter Student Act and the proposed
Capital Student Adjustment Act).
61 Kan Stat Ann § 76-731a (2004). See Day v Sebelius, 376 F Supp 2d 1022, 1040 (D
Kan 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims challenging the statute for lack of standing and
lack of private right of action),
62 See Doe 1 et al v Merten, 219 FRD 387, 396 (E D Va 2004) (denying plaintiffs' motion to proceed by fictitious names); Equal Access Education v Merten, 305 F Supp 2d 585,
614 (E D Va 2004) (procedural); Equal Access Education v Merten, 325 F Supp 2d 655,
673 (E D Va 2004) (holding there is no Supremacy Clause bar to Virginia public postsecondary educational institutions denying admission to undocumented aliens, as long as
they use only federal standards in doing so, and do not consistently misapply those standards). See also Olivas, 30 J Coll & Univ L at 455 n 122 (cited in note 23).
63 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, it became Day v Bond (No 05-3309), and oral arguments were heard September 27, 2006. Transcripts are available at <http://
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was filed in California state court, where the plaintiffs lost; an
appeal is pending in 2006.64 And Congress has under consideration a federal version of the state statutes, the DREAM Act,
65
which if enacted would also accord limited legalization benefits.

www.mountainstateslegal.org/legaLcases.cfm?legalcaseid=125>
(last visited Feb 25,
2007).
64 Martinez v Regents of the University of California, 2006 WL 2974303, *2-6 (Cal
Super Ct, Yolo Cty, 2006) (Order on Demurrers, Motion to Strike, and Motions by Proposed Intervenors) (dismissing challenge to state residency statute). This action, dismissed on October 6, 2006, was the state equivalent of the Day v Sibelius federal case in
Kansas, which was argued at the Tenth Circuit in September, 2006.
In an unrelated case, MALDEF and others filed a case bringing a challenge to Cal
Educ Code § 68040; 5 CCR § 41904 and the State Constitution (postsecondary residency
and financial aid provisions) in California Superior Court, County of San Francisco, in
Nov, 2006. Student Advocates for Higher Education v Trustees, California State University, available at <http://www.sftc.org/Scripts[Magic94/mgrqispi94.dll?APPNAME=IJS&
PRGNAME=ROA&ARGUMENTS=-ACPF06506755> (last visited Jan 6, 2007).
65 There is a remarkable amount of literature on this small topic. See, for example:
Kris W. Kobach, The Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking: Why the DREAM
Act is a Nightmare (Heritage Foundation 2006) (putting forth the opinion that the Act
would reward those who break the law and encourage states to defy federal law); Congressional Research Service, Jody Feder, RS22500, UnauthorizedAlien Students, Higher
Education, and In-State Tuition Rates: A Legal Analysis (July 20, 2006); Paz M. Oliverez,
et al, eds, The College & FinancialAid Guide for: AB540 Undocumented Immigrant Students, Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis 16-22 (University of Southern California 2006) (explaining the proposed Act); Jeanne Batalova and Michael Fix, New Estimates of Unauthorized Youth Eligible for Legal Status under the DREAM Act (Migration
Policy Institute 2006) (discussing the major features of the DREAM Act and providing
estimates of the number of young unauthorized persons likely to be eligible for immigration relief if the DREAM Act were to become law). I believe that the MPI report considerably overstates the extent to which students will take advantage of the DREAM Act,
which is sure to turn on the details and requirements of the legislation, should it be enacted into law.
In addition, there are developments in other immigration categories, such as college aid for victims of human trafficking. The federal government provides further information in a press release. New Process Benefits Victims of Human Trafficking Seeking
College Aid, (U.S. Dept of Education May 9, 2006), available at <http://ifap.ed.gov/
FSACounselorslclcflwhatsnew.html> (last visited Feb 25, 2007).
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Table 2
States that Allow Undocumented Students to Gain Resident
Tuition Status through Statute (Fall 2006)
States
California
Illinois
Kansas
Nebraska
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Texas

Utah
Washington

Legislation and Statute
AB 540, 2001-02 Leg, Reg Sess (Cal 2001), codified at Cal Educ
Code § 68130.5 (Deering 2007).
HB 60, 93d Gen Assemb, Reg Sess (Ill 2003), codified in various
sections of 110 Ill Comp Stat Ann (LexisNexis 2007).
HB 2145, 2003-2004 Leg, Reg Sess (Kan 2004), codified at Kan
Stat Ann § 76-731a (2006).
LB 239, 99th Leg, 1st Sess (Neb 2006), codified at Neb Rev Stat
Ann § 85-502 (LexisNexis 2006) (overriding governor's veto).
SB 582, 47th Leg, Reg Sess (NM 2005), codified at NM Stat Ann
§ 21-1-4.6 (LexisNexis 2007).
SB 7784, 225th Leg, 2001 Sess (NY 2002), codified at NY Educ
Law § 355(2)(h)(8) (Consol 2007).
SB 596, 49th Leg, 1st Reg Sess (Okla 2003), codified at Okla Stat
Ann tit 70, § 3242 (West 2006).
HB 1403, 77th Leg, Reg Sess (Tex 2001), codified as amended by
SB 1528, 79th Leg, Reg Sess (Tex 2005) in various sections of Tex
Educ Code Ann ch 54 (Vernon 2007).
HB 144, 54th Leg, Gen Sess (Utah 2002), codified at Utah Code
Ann. § 53B-8-106 (2006).
HB 1079, 58th Leg, 2003 Reg Sess (Wash 2003), codified at Wash
Rev Code Ann § 28B.15.012 (LexisNexis 2007).

Table 3
States Formally ConsideringLegislation Regarding Undocumented Students and Residency Tuition Status (Fall,2006)
Legislation Introduced by Fall 2006
Alaska
Arizona
California
(eligibility for state financial aid)*
Colorado
Delaware**
Florida
Hawaii
Kansas***
Maryland*
Massachusetts*

Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
New Jersey
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utah***
Virginia****
Wyoming*****

* Pro-immigrant bill vetoed by governor.

** Public institutions in Delaware have agreed to allow undocumented students to
establish residency status, in lieu of legislation that introduced in the Delaware
General Assembly.
*** Bill introduced to repeal existing residency statute.
Anti-immigrant bill vetoed by governor.
***** Enacted bill limits state scholarships to legal permanent residents and citizens.
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In sum, Plyler has proven quite resilient, fending off litigation challenges, as well as federal and state legislative efforts to
overturn it, while nurturing efforts to extend its reach to college
students who were allowed to stay in school by the original case.
IIRIRA and PWRORA, however imperfectly, gave it additional
life by choking off the Gallegly Amendment. It has had to be reinforced by vigilant efforts, but it has proven more hardy than it
appeared twenty-five years ago. Wide-ranging discussions with
many restrictionist advocates have convinced me that the real
purpose behind their comprehensive efforts is to reverse Plyler,
in the hopes that doing so will deter families from entering the
country illegally.
II. "THE QUINTESSENTIAL FORCE MULTIPLIER" EFFECT
The law of political thermodynamics holds that for every
academic civil rights action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. So it is with the hydraulic principle of immigrants' rights.
The modest successes have been matched by a substantial blowback in the political arena, as evidenced by the NCSL data in
Table 1. The essential failure of Prop. 187 required enormous
political and legal capital to be expended by immigrants' rights
groups, but the constitutional amendment was defeated. 66 The
efforts clearly slowed state or local initiatives to enact comprehensive anti-alien legislation. Even the enactment of IIRIRA and
PWRORA in 1996, as reactionary as any immigration legislation
in the late twentieth century, still occurred at a time when
IRCA's legalization program and successes (enacted during the
Reagan presidency) were being played out. 67 The terrorist attacks of 2001 stalled any legalization or regularization initiatives
66 See Inniss, 10 Georgetown Immig L J at 580 (cited at note 49) (describing Proposition 187 as a "weapon in a deliberate attempt to force a confrontation between antiimmigrant and pro-immigrant forces"); Johnson, 42 UCLA L Rev at 1559 (cited at note
49) (recounting court enjoinment of Proposition 187). See Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling
Out of School Undocumented College Residency, Race, and Reaction, 22 Hastings Const L
Q 1019, 1057-61 (1995) (detailing the court's error in mischaracterizing federal law on
undocumented college residency). For a more modern mistake on the same issue, this one
by restrictionist groups and lawyers, see Kobach, Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking (cited in note 65); Dan Stein, Why Illegal Immigrants Should Not Receive InState Tuition Subsidies, Univ Bus 64 (2002). But see Michael A. Olivas, A Rebuttal to
FAIR, Univ Bus 72 (2002).
67 See IRCA, Pub L 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (1986). Consider Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 NYU L Rev 1047 (1994)
(discussing IRCA); Kevin R. Johnson, The AntiterrorismAct, the ImmigrationReform Act,
and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 St Mary's L J 833 (1997) (same).
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President Bush might have undertaken,6 8 but the changed circumstances in the postsecondary residency area have been instructive of how local and state politics can surprise. Except for
the Texas statute, signed by Republican Governor Rick Perry
(who assumed office when Governor Bush became President
Bush) just before 9/11, all the residency statutes have been
signed into law after the terrorist attacks against the United
States. Major immigrant-receiving states such as Texas, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and New York have granted residency
to undocumented college students, but so have surprising states
such as Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Utah. 69 Along with
other senators, it has been conservative Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch who has advocated for the DREAM Act at the
federal level. 70 But support for residency tuition classification by
some politicians (or even failure to oppose a measure sufficiently)
has created controversy in some states, where polarized elector71
ates have resulted on wedge issues.
Notwithstanding the broadly-based support for these Plyler
college students, of course there is another side: persons who feel
that the students should not benefit from their parents' actions
and that the students, in essence, do not have clean hands. One
such believer is Professor Kris W. Kobach, who teaches at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School. Professor Kobach has undertaken lawsuits (in Kansas and California), advo68 See Mike Allen, Bush to Seek Immigrant Benefit Protection;Plan to Include System
Enabling Undocumented Workers to Gain Legal Status, Wash Post A5 (Jan 4, 2004) (stating that the Bush "administration began trying to harden the borders after the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001").
69 In a number of these legislative sessions, the discussions and politics have been
quite fascinating. For example, on April 14, 2006, Nebraska became the tenth state to
provide in-state, resident tuition to undocumented immigrant students who have attended and graduated from its high schools. It did so in dramatic fashion, overriding
Governor Dave Heineman's veto. The bill had passed by a 26-19 margin, but needed 30
votes for an override; supporters managed to acquire exactly 4 votes to get the necessary
30. See, Kobach, The Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking at 3 (cited in note
65); Ruth Marcus, Immigration's Scrambled Politics, Wash Post A23 (April 4, 2006).
70 See Josh Bernstein, Dream Act Reintroduced in Senate, (National Immigration
Law Center 2005), available at <http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/DREAM/Dream
002.htm> (last visited Feb 25, 2007) (indicating the role of original sponsors).
71 See, for example, Joyce Purnick, In a G.O.P. Stronghold, 3 Districtsin IndianaAre
Now Battlegrounds,NY Times Al (Oct 21, 2006) (describing generally how immigration is
a contentious issue in the Indiana congressional races); Carl Hulse, In Bellwether District,
G.O.P. Runs on Immigration, NY Times Al (Sept 6, 2006) (mentioning how public grade
school education of undocumented immigrants is controversial). After the November,
2006 elections, the returns appear to reflect a moderation of anti-immigrant views.
Randal C. Archibold, Democratic Victory Raises Spirits of Those Favoring Citizenship for
Illegal Aliens, NY Times A27 (Nov 10, 2006) (assessing election results for ballot initiatives, anti-immigrant candidates).
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cated through national organizations to repeal state laws or to
discourage federal legislation, and written articles and reports
against alien benefits generally. 72 He also ran for Congress in
Kansas on an anti-alien campaign, and although he lost, he has
73
continued his advocacy efforts.
In a long 2005 piece in the Albany Law Review, "The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests,"74 Kobach makes a forceful
argument that municipal authorities have all the intrinsic authorization they need to enforce laws, including laws affecting
immigration and immigrants (and non-immigrants, in or out of
proper status). His thesis is straightforward: "This inherent arrest authority has been possessed and exercised by state and lo' 75
cal police since the earliest days of federal immigration law.
And while he may or may not be correct in his analysis, he is
not in doubt. Here is his take on the terrorists, in his first paragraph:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored
for all Americans the link between immigration law enforcement and terrorism. Nineteen alien terrorists had
been able to enter the country legally and undetected,
overstay their visas or violate their immigration statuses
with impunity, and move freely within the country without significant interference from federal or local law enforcement. The abuse of U.S. immigration laws was instrumental in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people. Moreover, any suicide attack by an alien terrorist in the future
will likely entail additional violations of U.S. immigration
laws. Either the terrorist will attempt to enter the United
States legally and will violate the terms of his nonimmigrant status in the planning and execution of his attack,

72 See, for example, Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 179 (cited in note 25). Consider,
Kobach, The Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking (cited in note 65) (arguing
against enactment of the DREAM Act).
73 See The 2004 Elections: Congress; The Races for the House, NY Times P12 (Nov 4,
2004) (showing results of congressional race in Kansas). Professor Kobach has litigated
both the Day case in Kansas federal court and the Martinez case in California state court.
I assisted state legislative staff in drafting the Kansas statute, was the state's witness in
the Day federal case, and assisted with the defendant discussions and briefwriting for
both the district court and Tenth Circuit matters.
74 Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 179 (cited in note 26).
75 Id at 183.
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or the alien terrorist will enter without inspection (EWI),
76
which is itself a violation of U.S. immigration law.
While it is difficult to envision a principled defense of the
terrorists' perfidious crimes, it is not at all clear that the lesson
to be drawn is that immigration laws were the enablers, at least
not in the manner Kobach sketches. He goes on to cite the terrorists' involvement in various transgressions, and he draws terrifying linkages:
Of critical importance is the fact that all four of the hijackers who were stopped by local police prior to 9/11 had
violated federal immigration laws and could have been detained by the state or local police officers. Indeed, there
were only five hijackers who were clearly in violation of
immigration laws while in the United States-and four of
the five were encountered by state or local police officers.
These were four missed opportunities of tragic dimension.
Had information about their immigration violations been
disseminated to state and local police through the NCIC
system, the four terrorist aliens could have been detained
for their violations. Adding even greater poignancy to
these missed opportunities is the fact that they involved
three of the four terrorist pilots of 9/11. Had the police officers involved been able to detain Atta, Hanjour, and
Jarrah, these three pilots would have been out of the picture. It is difficult to imagine the hijackings proceeding
without three of the four pilots. The four traffic stops also
offered an opportunity to detain the leadership of the 9/11
terrorists. Had the police arrested Atta and Hazmi, the
operation leader and his second-in-command would have
been out of the picture. Again, it is difficult to imagine the
attacks taking place with such essential members of the
9/11 cohort in custody.
Importantly, all of these transgressions were civil, not
criminal, violations of the INA. Therefore, according to
the view of those who contend that Congress has preempted state and local police from making arrests for civil
violations of the INA, no local police officer would have
had the authority to arrest any of these hijackers on the

76

Id at 179.
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basis of his immigration violation(s). In other words, even
if the INS had developed a program to detect such violations and report the names of violators to local law enforcement agencies prior to the 9/11 attacks, the hands of
local police would have been tied, and they would have
been unable to help stop the attacks. Not only is it implausible to assert that Congress would have intended
such a consequence as a policy matter, it is difficult to
sustain such an assertion as a legal matter .... 77
For want of a nail, or a traffic stop. But as compelling as this
saga is, it is not a sufficient justification for additional local or
state enforcement of immigration laws. By Kobach's count, four
of the terrorists had violated various laws or regulations suffi78
cient to have drawn attention to their murderous intentions.
Yet, by his own data, almost 17 million drivers in 2002 were
stopped by police, or 8.7 percent of all the licensed drivers in the
U.S. (or, more accurately, licensed and unlicensed drivers over 16
years of age).7 9 As irksome or even as dangerous as such apprehensions are, it is hardly an argument that the undocumented or
non-immigrants are a sizeable proportion of such threats to the
highway. Indeed, if they were a sizeable or disproportionate
number of stopped drivers, such a condition would plausibly and
convincingly argue that this population should be required to
obtain, not be prohibited from obtaining, drivers' licenses and the
attendant registration, testing, and insuring.8 0 Counting these
minor violations as likely occasions for intercepting terrorists is
chimerical, and obscures the real problems of poor data and the
inability of national defense agencies to coordinate with each
other.8 1 There is plenty of active and passive blame to go around,
no matter one's political affiliation.

77 Id at 187-88 (emphasis in original).
78 See Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 184 (cited in note 26).
79 See id at 188 n 62. See also Erica L. Smith and Matthew R. Durose, Characteristics

of Drivers Stopped by Police, 2002 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006), available at
<http://www.ojp.usdojgovbjs/pub/pdf/cdsp02.pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2007).
80 See generally, Maria Pab6n Ldpez, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions
on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 SIU L J 91 (2004) (discussing drivers
license requirements for noncitizens both pre- and post-9/11).
81 National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 145-253 (National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States
2004), available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/91 1Report.pdf> (last visited
Feb 25, 2007).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

He also argues that the hijackers were in violation of laws by
enrolling in flying school classes with B-2 visas, when this is not
accurate.8 2 Not only were B-2 students allowed to enroll in such
short courses, but two of the hijackers' visas were approved in
the regular course of 2001 business, six months to the day after
the September 11, 2001 actions, causing great embarrassment to
83
the then-INS.
My purpose here is not to rebut each point of Professor Kobach's over-heated version of events, and I certainly do not wish
to debate the merits of the Mara Salvatrucha 13 drogeros,8 4 but
it is essential that these matters be kept in perspective, not
linked to every global threat that might harm us. After all, the
real laxity, according to the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, was in
not linking all the dots due to bureaucratic territoriality, and the
failure to take seriously the rise of radical Islam following the
earlier bombing of the World Trade Center.85 Indeed, educational
authorities had properly and courageously reported Zacarias
Moussaoui when he tried to learn steering but not takeoff or
82 See Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 186 (cited in note 26); David Firestone and Matthew L. Wald, Flight Schools See Downside To Crackdown, NY Times Al (May 27, 2002)
(noting that the INS imposed new rules in April 2002 prohibiting foreigners from becoming students while on tourist visas). Consider Kate Murphy, In Choosing a Flight School,
Check Beyond the Cockpit, NY Times 3-5 (Oct 29, 2006) (outlining average person's experience in flight school).
83 For a discussion of post-9/11 actions meant to shore up gaps in immigration regulations posing security risks, see Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Profiling,September 11 and
the Media: A Critical Race Theory Analysis, 2 Va Sports and Ent L J 1, 29-34 (2002);
Diana Jean Schemo, A Nation Challenged: Foreign Students: College Officials Are Wary
on Visa Enforcement, NY Times B6 (Dec 15, 2001) (recognizing that since 9/11 INS "has
been under intense Congressional pressure to close loopholes in issuing visas and tracking foreigners, particularly students"); Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged:Domestic Security: Senate Passes Bill to Strengthen Border Security, NY Times A14 (April 19, 2002)
(describing Senate bill that would "increase the number of immigration inspectors and
investigators, require universities to keep better track of foreign students and heighten
scrutiny on visa applications from foreign countries listed as sponsors of terrorism");
Rachel L. Swarns, Program's Value in Dispute As a Tool to Fight Terrorism, NY Times
A26 (Dec 21, 2004) (describing how many participants in a program registering citizens
from Arab and Muslim countries were deported based on immigration status but not
charges related to terrorism).
84 Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 193 (cited in note 26) (citing authorities on narcotrafficking Central American gang). Consider Ginger Thompson, Shuttling Between Nations, Latino Gangs Confound the Law, NY Times A26 (Sept 26, 2004) (describing Latin
American gangs and their relation to US immigration and crime). See also the excellent
article by Professor Jennifer Chac6n in this issue, Whose Community Shield?: Examining
the Removal of the "CriminalStreet Gang Member" 2007 U Chi Legal F 317, noting the
demonization of gangs and prisoners.
85 National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report at Chap 3 (cited in note 81) (reviewing earlier bombing and missed connections).
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landing measures;8 6 off-the-shelf aviation training videos were
87
available for instructional purposes.
And it is difficult to quarrel with his assertion that various
police authorities should cooperate more with each other, although the key is the extent to which this is feasible and efficacious. There are already a number of provisions for local and
state law enforcement agencies to enter into Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU"), under the authority of IIRIRA, and these
have been in place for over a decade.88 However, these provisions
were not taken advantage of until 2002, when Florida entered
into a MOU to train 35 state and local officers.8 9 Since 2002, ICE
has entered into MOU with only a handful of states, to train several hundred officers. 90 The law enforcement persons most famil86 See 9/11 Commission Report at Chap 8, "The System Was Blinking Red," 273-276
(reviewing Moussaoui, flight training, and the FBI), available at <http://www.9llcommission.gov/reportl9llReportCh8.pdf> (last visited March 11, 2007). Consider
David Johnston and Jim Dwyer, Pre-9/11 Files Show Warnings Were More Dire and
Persistent, NY Times Al (Apr 18, 2004) (George Tenet learned the FBI had arrested
Zacarias Moussaoui after he had enrolled in a flight school, but took no action); Neil A.
Lewis, Prosecutors Concede Doubts About Moussaoui's Story, NY Times A18 (Apr 20,
2006) (describing Moussaoui's attempt to implicate another terrorist in plot); F.B.I. Whistle-Blower Is Criticized in Report, NY Times A12 (June 20, 2006) (showing that the FBI
failed to aggressively investigate Moussaoui).
87 See The Four Flights: Staff Statement No. 4, 6 (National Commission on Terrorist
Acts Upon the United States 2006), available at <http://www.9-llcommission.gov/
staffstatements/staff statement_4.pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2007). For a sense of how
the flight simulators operate, see Mark J. Prendergast, Library/FlightSimulators: Soaring at 4,500 Feet, Steps from the Fridge,NY Times G9 (April 16, 1998).
88 Fact Sheet: Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, A Law Enforcement
Partnership(Department of Homeland Security 2006) (announcing IIRIRA MOU policies,
agreements). But see Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local
Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U Cin L Rev 1373, 1374-1375 (2006)
(pointing out that certain local governments oppose local cooperation in immigration law
enforcement); Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection,and Federalism,76 NYU L Rev 493, 568 (2001) (concluding that
Congress cannot "devolve its exclusive immigration power to the states").
89 See Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 197 (cited in note 26); Pham, 74 U Cin L Rev at
1374 n5 (cited in note 88).
90 Pham, 74 U Cin L Rev at 1374 n5 (cited in note 88) (stating that ICE has entered
into MOU with Florida, Alabama, and Los Angeles County); Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at
197 (cited in note 26); Fact Sheet: Section 287(g) Immigrationand Nationality Act, A Law
Enforcement Partnership (Department of Homeland Security 2006) (cited in note 88).
Additionally, the Houston Police Department revised its procedures, following the murder
of a police officer who had arrested a once-departed criminal felon alien who had entered
without inspection a second time. The alien was handcuffed in the back of the police vehicle, but apparently had a gun that had not been evident when he was frisked and patted
down by the officer. I watched the television news in horror as this occurred, and then
cringed as the issue dominated Houston news and politics for several weeks in the month
leading up to the 2006 elections. See Anne Marie Kilday, et al, Shooting Raises Issue of
Policing Immigrants, Houston Chron Al (Sept 23, 2006) (describing the incident); Matt
Stiles, HPD Revising Its Immigration Policy, Houston Chron Al (Oct 1, 2006) (describing
the changes in policy the Houston Police Department instituted to allow more cooperation
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iar with these issues, and those closest to the ground, have
known of the opportunities available to coordinate with federal
authorities, and have chosen overwhelmingly not to do so, even
after 9/11.
That Congress has expressly allowed for MOU to delegate
and share enforcement in certain narrow categories would rebut
Kobach's wider, boundless reading of the preemption powers. I
do not parse all these arguments, as I believe others have done
so persuasively and in great detail, 9 1 but it is hard to reconcile
the legislative history of MOU with an "inherent power" theory,
one that, if correct, would obviate the need for law enforcement
ever entering into the cooperative agreements. It is one thing to
delegate training, to share resources, and to agree to cooperate,
but it is quite another to consider such non-emergency federal
measures as impliedly conceding any enforcement authority; it is
certainly not an indication of "inherent authority," but the reverse. It is a textbook example of the proper delegation of powers.
There are provisions that reserve to ICE or other federal
immigration authorities the exclusive enforcement authority,
while Congress has granted authority to share some aspects of
enforcement, but in narrow, formal fashion. For example, Subsection (c) of 8 USC § 1324 ("Authority to Arrest") grants the
right to "make any arrest for a violation of [the Harboring provisions to] . ..officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws."92
Provisions for cooperative arrangements to share data and to act
as a liaison with internal security officers are spelled out in USC
§ 1105.93 Another example of such modest law enforcement is the
§ 287 (g) provisions for non-emergency assistance in the enwith federal agents trying to catch criminals living in the country illegally); Alexis Grant
and Kristen Mack, Court to Decide: Does DeportationFit Crime?, Houston Chron Al (Oct
2, 2006) (noting that the mayor of Houston claimed that though the murder sped the
adoption of new policy of asking people arrested in minor crimes for identification, the
change was already being considered). According to Mexican American Bar Association
officials in Houston, as soon as this policy was announced the criminal courts in Harris
County began requiring Spanish-speakers' court-appointed translators to report to sheriff's deputies for interviews about citizenship before providing the services, and for fingerprinting. According to these lawyers, the DA's office is now transmitting the fingerprints to ICE, even as cases are pending.
91 Consider Pham, 74 U Cinn L Rev 1373 (cited in note 88); Wishnie, 76 NYU L Rev
493 (cited in note 88); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31
Fla St U L Rev 965 (2004).
92 IIRIRA, 8 USC § 1324 (2000 & Supp 2006).
93 See 8 USC § 1105.
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forcement of immigration laws. 94 It is clear that Congress acted
in these places, and they are no concession of interest or intrinsic
authority, but rather the opposite.
None of these provisions or any other such narrow cooperative arrangement implicates core immigration functions, and neither exemplifies inherent authority. Thus, this limited cooperative assistance is carefully set out by Congress as a modest delegation, and even so, one that very few jurisdictions have undertaken. Clearly, even with its impatience at the underwhelming
federal success in undertaking border security and immigration
enforcement, Congress has made provisions for only a small scale
sub-federal role, one that does not necessitate or create realignment of responsibilities. And local law enforcement and governmental authorities have chosen not to use these modest tools,
even those that might arguably help them combat overall crime
in their jurisdictions.
Kobach's argument is more grounded than was Spiro's, in
the sense that he provides detail of on-the-ground law enforcement, whereas the demi-sovereigity ideal is more ethereal and
rooted in the foreign powers. 9 5 But the essence of both is the
same, whether one tries to stretch preemption by fire or by ice.
Congress does not want, and the separation of powers and preemption theory do not allow, a substantial subcontracting of this
basic immigration authority to state and local governments. We
do not want fifty foreign affairs policies, or fifty immigration
policies. We certainly do not want and cannot tolerate hundreds,
allowing liberal Santa Fe, New Mexico to carve out a "sanctuary"
while Hazleton, Pennsylvania or Norcross, Georgia get to run
every bilingual speaker or dark-complexioned person out of town
after sundown. Indeed, even contemplating a redeployment of
the type Kobach endorses begs the question of how redeployment
and MOU's parallel enforcement will inevitably strain the quality of both local policing and national immigration enforcement.
These are not fungible, and combining the two would certainly
weaken both functions. In a checkerboard of jurisdictions in major metropolitan land areas such as Los Angles, Phoenix, and
Houston, how could a national policy be overlaid on such complex
and disparate jurisdictions? Driving across these large metropolitan areas criss-crosses dozens of municipalities and jurisdic-

94 See 8 USC § 287(g).
95 Consider Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev 179 (cited in note 26).
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tions. Can each have its own immigration and enforcement policy?
Additional problems arise when considering the Kobach proposals, problems of efficacy, of likely non-uniformity in enforcement, and of a race to the bottom as law enforcement takes on
tasks for which it is not institutionally prepared. One careful
study characterized such proposals as "the Inherent Flaw in the
Inherent Authority Position,"96 while another noted the probable
result that "these measures seem likely to expose local police to
liability for wrongful arrest and in some instances for violations
of state or local anti-profiling ordinances." 97 Even President Bush
has acknowledged that if undocumented communities are "victimized by crime, they are afraid to call the police, or [to] seek
recourse in the legal system."9 8 A more reasonable position would
take its cues from the enforcement community, which has chosen
not to use this extreme authority.
CONCLUSION

When I consider the hydraulics of preemption, about which I
have thought for a long time, and the likely downsides of the "inherent authority" issue, and when I count the rise of immigration-related proposals at the local and state level, I am convinced
that no good can come from sub-federal assumption of immigration powers. Some of the inefficiencies in the current system are
incontestably dysfunctional, but so would be the result of increased overlap in immigration enforcement. Most importantly,
these changes would not appreciably improve the current system, which already has coordinating provisions built-in, if not
widely adopted.
Blowback in affected communities and prejudice are sure to
follow from, among many examples, enforcing workplace raids
and labor stations, 99 requiring Spanish-language preachers not to
96 Pham, 31 Fla St U L Rev at 965 (cited in note 91).
97 Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U
Pa J Const L 1084, 1115 (2004).
98 Id (citation omitted).
99 Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v City of Redondo Beach, 127 Fed Appx
994, 994 (9th Cir 2005) (affirming preliminary injunction for complaint challenging City
Municipal Code that makes it unlawful to stand and solicit employment). I am a board
member of MALDEF, the group that challenged this ordinance, and agreed to undertake
this litigation. For a sample of the effects and unintended consequences of attempting to
regulate immigration/labor issues, see Arian Campo-Flores and T. Trent Gegax, A New
Spice in the Gumbo: Will Latino Day Laborers Locating in New Orleans Change its Complexion?, Newsweek 46 (Dec 5, 2005); Alex Kotlowitz, The Smugglers'Due, NY Times Mag
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proselytize in their congregants' language, 10 0 or necessitating
landlords in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, to check the immigration
status of renters. 101 All of these are sure signs of an ethnic and
national origin "tax" that will only be levied upon certain groups,
certain to be Mexicans in particular, or equally likely, Mexican
Americans. These more-than-petty nuisances, reminiscent of our
inglorious immigration history of racial exclusion, are the pigtail
ordinances in modern guise. 0 2 Despite their surface attractiveness and thin veneer, they should be resisted as fixes.
Fighting terrorism, of the homegrown or international variety, is not ground cover for discarding our traditional allocation
of immigration and enforcement powers. Congress, stalled in
partisan tactics and mid-term elections, tried to enact severe
measures, which in the anti-immigrant climate, could pass because no elected official wants to be painted as "soft on immigra71 (June 11, 2006); Julia Preston, U.S. Puts Onus on Employers Of Immigrants, NY
Times Al (July 30, 2006); Jill P. Capuzzo, A Town FightingIllegal Immigration Is Emptier Now, NY Times B1 (July 28, 2006). See also Katie Kelley, A Deal in Colorado on
Benefits for Illegal Immigrants, NY Times A18 (July 12, 2006); Barbara Ferry, "Out of the
Shadows", Santa Fe New Mexican Al (June 12, 2006); Nina Bernstein, U.S. Court Orders
City to Ensure Aid for Battered Immigrants, NY Times BI (Aug 30, 2006) (describing
court's attempt to remedy lack of public services for battered undocumented aliens). Not
as frequently noted is the transnational effect of immigration, including the effects upon
the sender regions. See, for example, Fernanda Santos, A Brazilian Outpost in Westchester County, NY Times B1 (June 26, 2006) (describing Brazilian influx into Westchester County).
100 The first person arrested in Georgia when a township enacted a comprehensive
immigration ban in 1999 was a Spanish-language Christian minister, who was prosecuted under the English-only provisions for posting signs for church services in the language of his congregation. Carlos Guevara v City of Norcross, 52 Fed Appx 486 (11th Cir
2002) (affirming, without opinion, N D Ga, No 00-00190-CV-CAP-1) (involving a city
ordinance restricting the use of a language other than English for any displayed sign
serving a non-residential purpose; dismissal of criminal charges against Spanishlanguage minister for posting signs in Spanish announcing religious services). While this
was a MALDEF case, I was not on the Board at the time the action was undertaken.
An entire industry has sprung up as these issues have arisen at the local level; a
small library would include: Kelley, A Deal in Colorado on Benefits for Illegal Immigrants, NY Times at A18 (cited in note 99) (concerning state resources); Ferry, "Out of the
Shadows" Santa Fe New Mexican at Al (cited in note 99) (describing organizing efforts);
Bernstein, U.S. Court Orders City to Ensure Aid for Battered Immigrants, NY Times at
B1 (cited in note 99) (describing how NYC is required to fund programs); Peter Wallsten,
PartiesBattle Over New Voter ID Laws, LA Times Al (Sept 12, 2006) (concerning identification requirements). As these pieces show, the ordinances cut deep into civic life, and
widely into a variety of local functions and benefits.
101 Gaiutra Bahadur, Latinos Lead Rally Opposing Ordinance: Though Hazleton, Pa.,
Will Delay the Law, Critics Keep the Pressure On, Philadelphia Inquirer B1 (Sept 4, 2006)
(concerning local immigration ordinance, Lozano v City of Hazleton, Penn).
102 Consider Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886) (striking down anti-Chinese ordinances); Ho Ah Kow v Nunan, 12 F Cas 252 (5 Sawyer 552) (CC D Cal 1879) (striking
down local ordinance regulating hair length); Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking
Asian America Through ImmigrationPolicy, 1850-1990 (Stanford 1993).
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tion crime." 10 3 Were I in office, I would not want to be perceived
as weak on such a fundamental issue. But I would hope to be
able to find common ground with others to enact legislation that
genuinely guards our borders instead of trading off our longstanding internal safeguards.

103 See, for example, Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S 2611, 109th
Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 7, 2006) in 152 Cong Rec S 4530 (May 15, 2006) (proposing a reform of
immigration laws); HR 5190, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 25, 2006) in 152 Cong Rec H 1741
(Apr 25, 2006) (moving for the creation of a Comprehensive Immigration Reform Commission); Immigration Relief & Protection Act, HR 6190, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 26,
2006) in 152 Cong Rec H 7496 (Sept 26, 2006) (proposing criminal sanctions for those
committing immigration fraud); DREAM Act, available at <http://www.nilc.org/immlaw
policy/DREAMlindex.htm> (last visited Jan 31, 2007).

